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QE or not QE? Was that the 
question….. for the MPC? 
By Professor John Clancy, Centre for Brexit Studies 
All the attention last week went on the Bank of England’s Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) and its decision to raise interest rates again. 
There were, however, two other widely unremarked upon (though 
actually very much remarkable) decisions made by the MPC. It also 
voted to maintain the current level and amount of Quantitative Easing 
(QE). So QE is still, if not in full metronomic swing, ticking over with 
quite some rhythm. 
This was covered in more detail just this Monday with the Bank of 
England’s Quantitative Easing (QE) report for Quarter 2 which gives 
the full figures of where QE is. And it is very much with us. 
 
The biggest part of QE was the buying of the government’s own stock 
of IOUs to others in the form of Bonds (Gilts). By 2016 it had hit 
£435Billion. These purchases paid for out of magically created 
reserves. 
As the various Asset Purchase Facility schemes are regarded to be 
functions of monetary policy, it was (as with the interest rate decision) 
a voted-upon decision by the 9 members of the MPC. 
 
These appear on the face of it to be neutral, no-change decisions. 
They are not. The MPC made a decision that the Bank of England 
would continue effectively to buy further tens of £billions of Gilts out of 
the marketplace, and £billions more of corporate bonds too. That is 
not insignificant. No reference as to the reasoning is given in the 
minutes, just the fact of the decision. 
Because some of the government bonds now in the possession of the 
Bank of England have started to mature, action is required. In QE 
Land, the gilts have evaporated. So the decision is actually to max out 
the credit card again, not pay it down. 
In March this year £10Billion in gilts evaporated. So in April the BoE 
bought £10Billion more. The decision last week authorises this to 
continue and will no doubt involve tens of £Billions of purchases 
before the year is out. 
The reason I believe this is misguided is because the MPC has 
missed one of the major unintended consequences of QE which has 
created an impact on the economy that MPC is not factoring into its 
wider monetary policy decisions. The effect of all of the QE bond-
buying spree from made-up reserves was to drive down the yields on 
Gilts to historic low levels. 
This then caused Pension Funds’ actuaries, who effectively base their 
annual accounting figures on Gilt yields, to calculate ever-soaring 
liabilities for the pension funds using ever-bizarre, and ultimately 
artificial ‘discount rates’. The lower went the bonds, the higher went 
the liabilities. And real discount rates fell to next to zero – a place 
where exponential effects on liabilities calculations mean they go into 
orbit – and in some cases discount rates went into (uncharted, Alice in 
Wonderland) negative territory. 
The reason this should matter for the MPC is that this pension fund 
behaviour bizarrely impacted on the real economy. 
Ordinary households were suddenly, as a result of the allegedly 
soaring liabilities, finding themselves with lower take-home pay 
because pension funds were suddenly demanding significant 
increases in monthly employee pension contributions. 
As importantly, employers were also suddenly being asked to hike 
their contributions too. In addition to higher monthly employer 
contributions, the appearance of these bizarre pension fund liabilities 
on private companies and public bodies’ own balance sheets meant 
deficit recovery programmes were drawing massive sums away from 
investment in the businesses, or public services being provided. They 
also made the businesses and public bodies look considerably 
shakier than they were. 
When combined, the biggest funded pension scheme in the country is 
the Local Government Workers Pension Fund at over £300billion in 
assets. The QE-led massive liabilities calculations in the local funds 
caused them to demand huge monthly increases from employees and 
employer councils. 
But on top of that, top-up payment demands running into billions of 
pounds were made of the local councils to close illusory deficits.  They 
had to be paid out of local councils’ revenues and capital, and also set 
against the councils’ assets. This meant more job losses and more 
cuts to their services, super-charging the austerity cuts to local 
government. 
In Birmingham the local pension fund demanded an extra £44million 
deficit top-up per year plus increases in employer contributions of 
another 1% of salary. This was money which could have been spent 
on employment and local government services. The liabilities of the 
funds now on the balance sheets of the local councils, leave them 
less able to borrow to invest in housing and the local economy. 
The drain from businesses plugging deficits and paying extra on the 
payroll has impacted on business investment. 
BT paid deficit funding contributions of £1.5Billion during March/April 
2015, £250 million in March 2016 and £250 million in March 2017. 
During the same time it had to increase its employer contributions 
from 13.5% of salary to 16.9%. It’s got to find £4.5 Billion in cash by 
2020 just for plugging the deficit. 
Surely all of this should have been and should now instead be put into 
capital investment and jobs? 
Carillion’s collapse was at the very least hastened by the ballooning 
deficits reported in its pension fund. 
Unfunded pension funds (teachers, the NHS, military, EU, for 
example) followed suit on cutting discount rates so as to mirror the 
processes in funded pension funds. 
I would argue that the very cause of all of this chaos is actually QE. 
Nowhere is there evidence that the MPC has considered this. 
The MPC has been looking the wrong way, or the other way. When 
assessing demand and output, costs and prices, the labour market 
and pay, and all of their components, did they even consider the 
impact of the QE-led pensions fall out? Did they factor it into 
monitoring business investment decisions? On money growth or 
contraction? 
The government should have intervened, on MPC advice, to set 
regulatory policy to counter the effects of QE on discount rates. A floor 
should have been placed on discount rates as QE began to bite. That 
would have been just as artificial as QE itself but just as justifiable 
when the most extreme dysfunction of markets occurred. 
I believe history will show that last week’s interest rate decision was a 
minor matter, which will probably be reversed, especially if a no deal 
Brexit hits. The decision to continue QE will actually have been a 
more significant and misguided decision. It will probably have a 
greater impact on the economy (though negatively) than the interest 
rate slight hike itself. 
What will monetary policy in relation to QE be if real economic 
turbulence follows a no-deal Brexit? Perhaps the very serious and 
rapid unwind of QE would have a greater impact than cuts to the 
interest rate. 
It should no longer be dodged: QE or not QE? That is the question. 
You can read the full working paper from Professor Clancy over 
on our website. 
 
